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Abstract 
In recent years, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have advocated for an 
‘interactive turn’ in the methodology of social-cognition research: to become more 
ecologically valid, we must design experiments that are interactive, rather than merely 
observational. While the practical aim of improving ecological validity in the study of social 
cognition is laudable, we think that the notion of ‘interaction’ is not suitable for this task: as 
it is currently deployed in the social cognition literature, this notion leads to serious 
conceptual and methodological confusion. In this paper, we tackle this confusion on three 
fronts: 1) we revise the ‘interactionist’ definition of interaction; 2) we demonstrate a number 
of potential methodological confounds that arise in interactive experimental designs; and 3) 
we show that ersatz interactivity works just as well as the real thing. We conclude that the 
notion of ‘interaction’, as it is currently being deployed in this literature, obscures an accurate 
understanding of human social cognition. 
1. Introduction 
Consider the following example of a typical social interaction: 
Ian and Mia 
Mia enters a coffee shop and sees her best friend Ian sitting on the sofa. Ian doesn’t 
notice her right away because he is stooped over his phone, closely examining the 
image of a woman on a dating website. Ian looks up and sees Mia, who smirks when 
she sees what he’s been looking at. Ian blushes and quickly puts away his phone. ‘It’s 
not what you think’, he says. ‘I’m helping Sarah set up her profile’. Mia chuckles and 
asks Ian if he would like something from the barista. Ian asks for a green tea. On her 
way back from the counter, Mia trips, and spills both of their drinks all over her jeans. 
She looks around, and notices how everybody in the coffee shop is staring at her. 
Now, contrast this with the following description of a standard false-belief task procedure, 
which is typical of social cognition research: 
Standard False-Belief Task 
Children see a toy figure of a boy and a sheet of paper with a backpack and a closet 
drawn on it. ‘Here’s Scott. Scott wants to find his mittens. His mittens might be in his 
backpack or they might be in the closet. Really, Scott’s mittens are in his backpack. But 
Scott thinks his mittens are in the closet’. ‘So, where will Scott look for his mittens? In 
his backpack or in the closet?’ (the target question) ‘Where are Scott’s mittens really? In 
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his backpack or in the closet?’ (the reality question). To be correct the child must 
answer the target question ‘closet’ and answer the reality question ‘backpack’. (Wellman 
and Liu [2004])  
Real-life social interactions like Ian and Mia are complex. They involve, among other 
things, belief ascriptions, gaze cues, emotional signals, gestures, relationships, and social 
conventions. Despite this complexity, the scientific study of such situations tends to rely on 
simplified, highly artificial paradigms like Standard False-Belief Task. Ostensibly, the kind 
of knowledge being tested in the false-belief task is also supposed to be the knowledge that 
Ian and Mia use in order to successfully navigate their social encounter—namely, their 
theory-of-mind. However, the difference between these two vignettes is hard to ignore. Of 
course, some might argue that for all their artificiality, we need tools like the false-belief task 
if we are ever to begin to make sense of how social cognition functions. This is a trade-off 
inherent to all experimental psychology: if we desire scientific rigor, we must sacrifice some 
ecological validity. 
However, there are a number of theorists who think that experimental paradigms in 
social cognition research like Standard False-Belief Task sacrifice far too much (De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo [2007]; Gallagher and Hutto [2008]; Schilbach et al. [2013]). For 
instance, in this experiment the child is set apart from Scott. There is no possibility for the 
two to interact. There are no reciprocal gaze cues, no emotional signals, no gestures, and no 
relationships. The child is merely a passive observer. In Ian and Mia, on the other hand, 
both agents are interacting. They mutually respond to and transmit a wide range of social 
cues, which get interpreted in a context-sensitive fashion.  
Interactionists conclude that, as a consequence of experimental oversimplification, 
traditional research on human social cognition has lost sight of the very phenomenon it set 
out to explain. What is needed, they propose, is an ‘interactive turn’ towards more ‘second-
personal’ methods and theories that acknowledge the dynamic, interdependent aspects of 
ordinary social experiences. More specifically, according to interactionists, past research is 
problematic because it relies heavily upon observational experimental paradigms. Real social 
cognition, however, almost always takes place in interactive contexts. As a result, current 
theoretical and empirical paradigms are thought to be ill-suited to study the cognitive 
processes at work in real-life social activities.  
One example of this kind of ‘interactionist’ approach to social cognition research is the 
double TV monitor paradigm (Murray and Trevarthen [1985]). In this experiment, 2-month 
old infants were shown a TV screen displaying a video of their mothers. In the ‘interactive’ 
condition, the video was live, while in the ‘non-interactive’ condition, the video showed a 
replay of their mother’s actions. It was found that infants quickly disengaged when presented 
with the replay video, but were far more motivated to attend to the feed in the interactive 
condition.  
Another example is the perceptual crossing paradigm (Auvray et al. [2009]; Auvray and 
Rohde [2012]). In this experiment, two players move an avatar along a one-dimensional strip 
using a computer mouse. When moving her own avatar along the strip, a player can cross 
paths with three objects: a static object, the other player’s avatar, and the other player’s 
avatar’s shadow (i.e. an object copying the movements of the other player’s avatar). Each 
agent receives the same sensory feedback upon crossing paths with any of these three 
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objects. Importantly, when one player’s avatar crosses paths with another player’s shadow 
only the player with the avatar receives feedback. If two players’ avatars meet, both players 
receive sensory feedback. Interestingly, although the sensory feedback a player receives from 
crossing paths with any of the objects is identical, players nevertheless typically manage to 
‘find’ one another (i.e. oscillate their avatars around each other).  
The interactionist criticism, thus far, amounts to the claim that traditional research 
paradigms such as Standard False-Belief Task need to be supplemented by novel 
interactive paradigms; and this criticism is well-taken. However, some interactionists have 
taken their critique a step further, and argued that the socio-cognitive processes at work in 
interactive contexts are fundamentally distinct from those that operate in observational ones. 
For instance, Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto have argued at length that mental state 
attribution really only occurs in observational scenarios; in social interactions, we rely upon a 
range of non-mentalistic processes, including gaze-following, social narratives, and emotional 
mirroring (Gallagher [2001], [2009], Hutto [2004], [2007]; Gallagher and Povinelli [2012]).  
At times, interactionists in the enactivist tradition make the even more radical claim that 
social interactions can actually constitute social cognition. Interactions, it is argued, have 
emergent properties that cannot be reduced to contributions of individuals. When two 
autonomous agents act in such a manner that their actions are ‘coupled’ (i.e. causally 
interdependent), this can create a higher order ‘dynamical system’ with its own intrinsic 
properties. These systems, it is claimed, are the true loci of social cognition (De Jaegher et al. 
[2010]). We should, therefore, abandon the idea that social cognition can fully be explained 
in purely individualistic terms. Instead, according to the interactionists, social cognition 
researchers ought to focus their efforts on the intrinsic properties of interactive systems. 
Other proponents of the interactive turn have de-emphasized the claim that social 
interactions are constitutive of social cognition. For instance, Gallotti and Frith have argued 
that interacting agents have ‘novel routes to knowledge of other minds’ that facilitate 
cooperation and team reasoning (Gallotti and Frith [2013], p. 162). This route to social 
knowledge is achieved by entering into the ‘we-mode’, a psychological state in which aspects 
of an interactive scene are represented via distinctively collective mental attitudes: believing-
together, intending-together, desiring-together, etc. When agents enter the ‘we-mode’, they 
co-represent the action-possibilities available to their interactive partners, and use this 
information to make decisions that achieve collective ends. Andreas Roepstorff and 
colleagues have also proposed that social situations can be interactive to varying degrees; 
with increasing degrees of interactivity, they find corresponding effects upon processing 
speed (Tylén et al. [2012]), accurate collective decision-making (Bahrami et al. [2012]), and 
physiological and behavioural alignment (Fusaroli et al. [2016]).  
While proponents of the interactive turn come in various flavors, they all endorse a 
central methodological claim: in order to promote ecological validity, experiments in social 
cognition need to become less observational and more interactive. In this paper, we will 
argue that this way of thinking is misguided. We are of course in favor of improving the 
ecological validity of social cognition research; however, we think that the notion of ‘social 
interaction’, as it is currently being deployed, is the wrong tool for the job. We argue that 
contrasting social cognition in interactive and non-interactive contexts is often 
uninformative, and prone to methodological confusion. This is because both the proximal 
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causes and underlying mechanisms that support naturalistic social cognition tend to straddle 
the interaction/observation dichotomy. In short, we believe that emphasizing ‘interaction’ is 
a red herring. 
To show why this is the case, we will first turn our attention to the definition of 
‘interaction’ that has become the standard in the interactionist literature. We will argue that 
this definition introduces concepts that needlessly complicate the target phenomena. In its 
place, we will offer a pared down, minimalist definition of ‘interaction’ that adequately 
captures the phenomena that interactionists are interested in. 
Next, we will point out an obstacle to any cognitive scientist wishing to implement 
‘interactionist’ experimental paradigms. This is that interactions are typically composed of 
many different social elements that are not themselves interactive. These concomitant social 
elements create a number of potential confounds for interactionist experiments, which social 
cognition researchers would do well to control for. To this end, we review four bodies of 
literature that illustrate the need for appropriate, non-interactive controls in interactionist 
paradigms: the ‘Social Simon Effect’, spontaneous perspective-taking, imitation, and 
conversational alignment.  
Finally, we will argue that in many cases, so-called ‘interactionist’ paradigms have really 
featured ersatz interactions. We think this shows that it is not interaction as such that really 
makes a difference in social cognition research, but rather that individual participants believe 
themselves to be interacting. This contradicts the basic anti-individualist thrust of 
interactionism.  
2. Defining ‘Interaction’ 
We now turn to the issue of defining ‘social interaction’. This turns out to be a delicate 
matter: while it is widely acknowledged that to develop an adequate theory of social 
cognition, we should be studying social interactions, there are ways of defining the term that 
largely presuppose a particular theory of social cognition. But if studying social interaction is 
supposed to provide evidence for these same theories, this ends up being circular. What is 
needed, rather, is a theory-neutral definition of social interaction that all interested parties 
can agree upon. This notion of interaction can then serve as a common point of departure 
for future debates. Therefore, our strategy in this section will be to start with the most 
prominent definition of social interaction in the extant literature, and then pare it down to a 
minimal, theory-neutral form. 
The most influential definition of ‘social interaction’ comes from De Jaegher, Di Paolo, 
and Gallagher [2010]:  
De Jaegher Interaction 
Two or more autonomous agents co-regulating their coupling with the effect that 
their autonomy is not destroyed and their relational dynamics acquire an autonomy 
of their own. Examples: conversations, collaborative work, arguments, collective 
action, dancing and so on. (De Jaegher et al. [2010], p. 441) 
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An ‘autonomous system’ is further defined as a ‘network of co-dependent, precarious 
processes able to sustain itself and define an identity as a self-determined system’ (De 
Jaegher et al. [2010], p. 441). The set of autonomous systems, on this definition, includes 
most biological life-forms, from single-celled organisms to human beings, and also socially 
constructed entities, like corporations and nations. In the context of social cognition, the 
relevant class of autonomous systems is restricted to autonomous agents. ‘Coupling’ occurs 
when one autonomous system causally impacts the functioning of another. Coupling is said 
to be ‘regulated’ when this causal impact is in some way controlled by that system; and it is 
said to be ‘co-regulated’ when two or more autonomous systems are controlling how they 
causally impact one another. Genuine social interactions, on this view, occur when this co-
regulated coupling results in the creation of a new autonomous system while still preserving 
the autonomy of the co-regulators. Lastly, this emerging interactive system is required to be 
temporally extended enough to take on ‘autonomy’ of its own.   
Our first issue with this definition is related to the idea that genuine social interactions 
take on ‘an autonomy their own’. As noted above, a definition of ‘social interaction’ should, 
where possible, be theory-neutral; it should not entail a particular social ontology.  However, 
the ontology implied by the above phrase is highly controversial: namely, that interactions 
create new autonomous systems. These autonomous systems are then thought to form the 
proper objects of social cognition research: they literally constitute social cognition (De 
Jaegher et al. [2010]). But a number of authors have argued that this claim amounts to a 
confusion of constitution and causation (Herschbach [2012]; Carruthers [2015]). Given that 
this debate is still ongoing, it seems unnecessary to hardwire such a controversial 
metaphysical claim into a practical, theory-neutral definition. Therefore, we propose the 
following first initial revision to De Jaegher’s et al.’s definition:  
Interaction - First Revision 
Two or more autonomous agents co-regulating their coupling with the effect that 
their autonomy is not destroyed.  
Our second worry concerns the role that the concept of ‘autonomy’ plays in this definition. 
In De Jaegher and colleagues’ definition, ‘autonomy’ is introduced as a technical notion 
according to which almost all biological life forms, not just human beings, can constitute 
autonomous systems (i.e. they can form self-sustaining and self-determining systems). 
Likewise, interactions between such autonomous systems don’t necessarily have to involve 
human beings either:  interactive systems would come into being whenever two cells cross 
paths in a petri dish, and whenever two countries engage in diplomatic negotiations. With 
such a broad scope, one might worry that this notion of social interaction is indeed too 
broad to be of any scientific utility. If the study of social cognition is to take an ‘interactive 
turn’, then interaction needs to be something that can be operationalized in a controlled, 
experimental setting.  
Presumably, it is for these reasons that De Jaegher and colleagues narrow their definition 
to be specifically about autonomous ‘agents’. However, in this case ‘autonomy’—at least in 
the technical sense of the term—does not do any definitional work. This is because the set 
of agents is a proper subset of the set of autonomous systems. Therefore, the phrase 
‘autonomous agent’ is not more informative than the term ‘agent’. 
6 
 
Furthermore, given their technical notion of autonomy, it is unclear why cases of 
coercion should be discounted, as De Jaegher and colleagues maintain (De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo [2007], p. 495; De Jaegher et al. [2010], p. 443). In a case of armed robbery, for 
instance, it would seem that we have an instance of correlated mutual behaviour that is at 
least as complex as the case of two people having a conversation. Why, then, would this fail 
to create an interaction? According to De Jaegher and colleagues, the coercive nature of the 
mugger’s actions would ‘destroy the autonomy’ of the victim. If the criteria for autonomy are 
so weak that bacteria in a petri dish can form an autonomous system, it is hard to see how it 
could be destroyed simply by demanding, ‘Your money or your life!’. Even if the victim 
complies, it seems as though her status as an autonomous system in the sense being used 
here would be preserved.  
Of course, there is a classic, Kantian sense in which the victim’s autonomy in this 
situation is compromised—namely, her ability to act in accordance with a law of her own 
choosing. If interactionists were to adopt this notion of autonomy in their definition, they 
could avoid the charge of vacuity. However, we would then need to dramatically revise the 
range of cases that would count as social interactions. First, the subset of entities that 
possess autonomy in this strong sense will be much smaller than those that possess it in the 
weaker sense. Young children and animals, for instance, are unlikely to be autonomous in 
this sense. Drug addicts and persons with cognitive disabilities would also likely to fall below 
the threshold. Women in highly patriarchal countries with oppressive religious laws would 
also lack this kind of autonomy. Second, although human agents can be autonomous in this 
sense, it is unclear what it would mean for a co-regulated coupling to create an autonomous 
system. In short, it is not clear when—if ever—the conditions for interaction would obtain, 
given this notion of autonomy. Lastly, and most importantly, it is not at all clear why an 
obviously normative notion should play a role in cognitive science. The fact that a person 
cannot act in accordance with the law of her own choosing does not obviously bear on the 
cognitive mechanisms she brings to bear when encountering other agents. 
These problems associated with the Kantian notion of autonomy also generalize to other 
normative theories of autonomy, which are generally unfit to constrain cognitive theories of 
interaction. To see this more clearly, consider the higher-order theory of autonomy defended 
by Michael Bratman (Bratman [2003], [2007]). According to Bratman, autonomous agents 
treat mere considerations to act as justifying reasons to act ([2007], p.178). Treating one’s 
considerations in this way functions as a guide to resolve indecision and is, therefore, 
desirable. Autonomy, understood in this way, is a normative notion. Agents can fail to act 
autonomously, if they fail to have appropriate higher-order regard for their first-order 
motivations. Importantly, it is implausible that agents who fail to treat their considerations 
for action as justifying reasons cannot engage in mundane (but clear) forms of interaction 
(e.g. paying the cashier for the groceries I wish to buy). In short, normative theories of 
autonomy introduce constraints that are too restrictive to ground cognitive accounts of 
interaction.  
Thus De Jaegher and colleagues’ reliance on ‘autonomy’ in their definition faces a 
dilemma: given the original, more technical notion of autonomy, interactions are so 
ubiquitous and variable that they do not form a category of scientific interest. Given a more 
demanding, normative notion of autonomy, interactions become so rare that it is not clear 
whether they occur at all. Interactionists could address this issue by providing an alternative 
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account of ‘autonomous systems’ that is situated somewhere in between these two extremes. 
But until such an account is provided, the notion of ‘autonomy’ is not scientifically useful. 
Therefore, we propose a second revision to De Jaegher’s definition:  
Interaction - Second Revision 
Co-regulated coupling between conscious human beings.  
This revised definition does away with the notion that interactions must be performed by 
autonomous systems. But nothing serious is lost. We noted that once the relevant class of 
agents is specified, the further classification ‘autonomous agents’ is explanatorily inert. The 
revised definition makes explicit that, in the context of social cognition, the relevant class of 
agents are conscious human beings. To be sure, other types of organism may also engage in 
interactions, but this need not concern us.  
Lastly, we propose a small addition to our definition: two agents or more co-regulate their 
coupling if the actors knowingly1 affect each other’s actions.  This further specification is 
necessary to rule out cases in which agents affect each other’s actions by mere accident. 
Consider the case in which you swipe the foliage from your lawn into my lawn. I, thinking 
that a sudden gust of wind is responsible, swipe it back into your lawn. You, having the same 
thought, swipe it back into my lawn. We keep doing this until the end of August, when the 
foliage finally decays. Although we’re affecting each other, we are, intuitively, not interacting. 
Moreover, our behaviour is uninteresting from the perspective of social psychology. Lastly, 
the addition of knowingly is preferable to the addition intentionally, because it does not 
exclude cases in which several agents affect each other’s actions by mere foresight2. 
In summary: after a few clarificatory modifications of De Jaegher and colleagues’ account 
of interaction, we are left with the following definition. 
Minimal Social Interaction 
When two or more conscious human beings mutually and knowingly affect one 
another’s actions, they are engaged in a social interaction. 
This minimalist definition fits nicely with paradigmatic examples of social interaction: 
conversation, dancing, cooking a meal together, playing tennis, etc. It also does not, 
however, eliminate cases of coercion and manipulation, such as the mugger scenario, or even 
actively violent encounters, such as fistfights. But it is not clear why these cases should be 
eliminated: surely, not all social interactions are pleasant and cooperative. While we may 
morally disapprove of these actions, this does not make them any less interactive. 
This minimalist definition also fits nicely with key examples of interactionist experiments. 
In the Double TV-monitor paradigm, for instance, the live-feed condition makes it so that 
infants and their mothers are able to mutually respond to one another’s actions; when the 
                                                          
1 Note that, for our purposes, knowingly should be given a deflationary reading that is common in psychology (Dienes and 
Perner [1999]; Nagel [2013]). Knowing X, in this sense, means ‘being aware of X and being sensitive to X when acting’. For 
instance, for Dienes and Perner (1999) mere perceptual awareness is sufficient for knowledge. What is more, having knowledge 
does not require recognizing that one has knowledge; i.e. it does not presuppose the concept KNOWLEDGE. Lastly, 
interacting knowingly does not presuppose the concept of INTERACTION; rather, it merely requires being aware of the 
constituents of interaction (e.g. the other person’s voice and actions).   
2 Think, for instance, of a case in which you merely intend to get the foliage off your lawn, but you also foresee that I’ll be mad 
when I find the foliage on my lawn. However, you don’t intend to make me mad; you merely foresee that this will happen. 
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recording of the mother’s expressions are played back for the child, this is no longer 
possible. In the perceptual-crossing study, participants are able to locate one another’s 
sensors on the one-dimensional strip because they are able to mutually respond to one 
another, whereas the ‘shadow’ and the fixed object cannot. 
According to the minimal approach, paradigms like the standard false-belief task would 
not count as interactive. This is because the actions of the character in the vignette do not 
affect the child’s actions, and the child’s actions do not affect those of the character in the 
vignette. The child merely observes the events taking place in the vignette, and then makes a 
prediction about them. There is no opportunity for a reciprocal exchange of information 
between the child and the character, nor any possibility for mutuality. It is decidedly non-
interactive. 
With this definition in hand, we are now in a position to defend our main point: if we 
want to improve the ecological validity of social cognition research, we should not frame this 
effort in terms of a distinction between interactive and observational scenarios.  
3. The Constituents of Interaction 
Proponents of an ‘interactive turn’ in social cognition research claim that in order to learn 
more about the nature of social cognition, we need to create more interactive experimental 
designs, and get away from purely observational paradigms. There is nothing wrong with 
designing interactive paradigms; however, it’s not clear how much we really learn when we 
try to directly compare interactive and non-interactive contexts. This is because social 
interactions typically involve many different elements that are not themselves interactive.  
To illustrate, take a prototypical interaction: a conversation with a colleague by the 
drinking fountain. Such an encounter would involve the physical co-presence of two 
individuals; however, this by itself would not make it an interaction. Likewise, the two 
speakers might possess mutual background knowledge about one another, including beliefs 
about each other’s occupation, political views, short- and long-term goals, and so on. But 
this too does not make the encounter an interactive one. The conversation also involves the 
use of language. But even this, all by itself, fails to make the context interactive: one could 
easily imagine a person speaking aloud to herself, while another person ignores her. None of 
these elements, by themselves, it seems, are enough to make an encounter interactive. But all 
the same, they seem to be very important elements of the context, from a cognitive 
perspective. 
Social interactions like this one seem to be complex events, composed of many elements 
that contribute to its interactive nature, and yet are not themselves interactive. All of these 
elements—physical co-presence, background knowledge, the use of language—often co-
occur in social interactions, but are neither necessary nor sufficient for an interaction to 
occur. But, as we shall see in this section, they still have considerable effects on social 
cognition. As such, it is unclear whether ‘interactive’ effects on social cognition are driven by 
interaction as such, or by one of its component elements. In this section, we use several 
distinct bodies of evidence to argue that simply contrasting interactive and non-interactive 
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scenarios is not informative. This, we claim, reveals a key oversight in the interactionist 
approach. 
3.1. The Social Simon Effect (Sebanz et al. [2003])  
In a typical ‘Simon’ task, subjects carry out responses using their left and right hands to 
stimuli appearing on the left and right sides of a screen; typically, subjects are faster to 
respond to stimuli appearing on the side congruent with the response (i.e. left side of the 
screen with left hand response), and slower to respond to items appearing on the 
incongruent side (i.e. left side of the screen with right hand response) (Craft and Simon 
[1970]). Natalie Sebanz and colleagues modified this task so that it involved two subjects 
participating in parallel to one another, each responsible for responding with either the left 
or right hand; thus, subjects only had to respond in a Go/No-Go fashion depending on 
what they saw on the screen, regardless of which side the stimuli appeared on (Sebanz et al. 
[2003]). Importantly, their performance in no way depended upon what the other agent 
did—all they ever had to do was pay attention to their own screen and respond accordingly. 
Thus, there was nothing interactive about the task. 
When subjects performed this task alone in a control condition, there was no spatial 
congruency effect—they were equally quick to respond to items on either side of the screen. 
But in the social condition, there was a spatial congruency effect: subjects were slower to 
respond to items on the side opposite their response hand (and on the same side as the other 
participant’s response hand). In effect, the presence of another agent altered the way they 
represented their environment, such that it included both their own action affordances, and 
those of the other agent. Even when seated side-by-side with another agent completing 
totally independent tasks, their sheer presence affects how we represent and respond to the 
environment. 
Since Sebanz and colleagues discovered the Social Simon Effect, a number of other 
experiments using similar paradigms have replicated and extended this finding. Using 
variants of the Social Simon paradigm, Guagnano and colleagues found that the Social 
Simon Effect dissipated with increased spatial separation between the two agents (i.e. within 
or beyond arm’s length) (Guagnano et al. [2010]); Vlainic and colleagues found that the effect 
persisted even when subjects had no online perceptual feedback from the other participant, 
demonstrating that simply knowing that another agent is completing a similar task is enough 
to alter how one represents one’s own action space (Vlainic et al. [2010]). Freundlieb and 
colleagues showed that when another agent was co-present but inactive, or co-present but 
completing a task of which the subject was ignorant, the effect dissipates (Freundlieb et al. 
[2015]).3  
Thus, simply knowing that another agent is acting nearby is enough to alter the way that 
we respond to our environment, even when no interaction—even in the minimal sense—is 
taking place. Given that most interactive experimental designs include the co-presence of 
active agents, it may be that co-presence effects—which are not, in fact, the products of 
                                                          
3 Guagnano et al. ([2010]) interpret their results as showing that the Social Simon Effect is due to participants representing their 
own action space, not the action affordances of those around them. But this claim in undermined by the results of Vlainic et al. 
([2010]) and Freundlieb et al. ([2015]), which show that knowledge of another agent’s action is key to generating the spatial 
congruency effect.  
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interaction—also occur in those tasks. This creates a methodological confound for 
proponents of the ‘interactive turn’ in experimental design: how are we to know whether 
purported interaction effects are genuine, or simply the product of the co-presence of other 
active agents?  
3.2. Level-2 perspective-taking 
Physical co-presence also seems to have an effect upon whether or not we spontaneously 
engage in certain forms of perspective-taking, the representation of what another agent can 
see. Psychologists typically distinguish between two ‘levels’ of perspective-taking (Masangkay 
et al. [1974]; Flavell et al. [1981]): Level-1 perspective-taking means representing whether or 
not a particular object is in the visual field of an agent, and is sensitive to external, 
environmental factors like line-of-sight and occlusion (Michelon and Zacks [2006]). Level-2 
perspective-taking further involves the ability to represent how an object appears to another 
agent; for instance, the numeral ‘6’ might, from one angle, appear to represent the number 
six, and from another angle, appear to represent the number nine; sensitivity to these 
differences requires an understanding of the aspectual nature of perception (Surtees et al. 
[2012], [2016]). Until recently, our best evidence suggested that while Level-1 perspective-
taking is automatic and effortless, Level-2 perspective-taking is effortful and requires top-
down, intentional control (Qureshi et al. [2010]; Samson et al. [2010]; Surtees et al. [2012]). 
However, the relevant perspective being taken in these tasks was always that of a non-
descript, computer generated avatar. But when the avatar is replaced with a live agent, we see 
a very different effect (Elekes et al. [2016]).  
In this experiment, subjects sat in front of a monitor lying flat in front of them, and had 
to verify whether or not the numeral on the screen matched a number they heard in an audio 
recording. In the Individual condition, subjects completed this task alone; in the Joint 
condition, subjects sat opposite another participant who was either also completing a 
number-verification task (i.e. the perspective-dependent task), or a different task in which 
they had to say whether the colour of the numeral on the screen was the same as one they’d 
seen just previously (i.e. the perspective-independent task). Participants in the joint condition 
always knew which task the person opposite them was completing. Importantly, all subjects 
had to do was complete their own task—the actions of the other agent were always 
irrelevant. Thus, the task was not interactive (given our definition). 
Elekes and colleagues found that subjects in the Joint condition were slower and made 
more errors than in the Individual condition, but only when both completed the perspective-
dependent task and the numerals of the screen were such that their values differed on the 
basis of perspective (i.e. 2, 5, 6 and 9); for numerals whose values appeared to be the same 
regardless of which side of the table the participant was at (i.e. 0 and 8), there was no 
difference between the Individual and Joint conditions. In effect, subjects were only slower 
when 1) they had a live partner, 2) they believed that their partner had a similar goal, and 3) 
the partner’s response would diverge from their own on the basis of their Level-2 
perspective. In other words, when subjects knew that the person across the table from them 
was viewing the numeral on the screen as a number, they spontaneously maintained a 
representation of what he or she saw, and this representation then interfered with their own 
performance. 
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Thus, in this task, the mere co-presence of an active agent was not sufficient to prompt 
Level-2 perspective-taking, but the combination of co-presence and the knowledge that this 
agent had a goal similar to their own did. These results complement those of the Social 
Simon Task: when another agent is co-present, active, and has a goal similar to our own, we 
spontaneously represent both how the environment appears to them, and the kinds of 
actions that are available to them in that environment. 
In interactive scenarios, of course, we are usually aware of the physical presence of other 
agents and their goals. Thus, we might expect that in those scenarios, we would also 
represent the affordances of the environment differently, or spontaneously adopt our 
partner’s visual perspective. Upon observing all of these levels of socio-cognitive processing 
layered on top of one another, it is tempting to hypothesize that social interactions are 
irreducibly complex, and possess emergent properties. However, many of the constituents of 
this interaction are indeed isolable, and we can study the effects of these constituents 
individually. Moreover, we know that these social effects on social cognition are not 
inherently interactive, because we can also observe them in non-interactive scenarios. This is, 
we think, the central problem with the ‘interactive turn’: by focusing on interaction as a 
global property of social-cognitive scenarios, we miss out on a wealth of local, fine-grained 
information that may be present in non-interactive contexts. 
A proponent of the ‘interactive turn’ could object that the cases we’ve described here are 
in fact best understood as effects of ‘we-mode’ cognition (Gallotti and Frith [2013]). For 
even though subjects in the Social Simon tasks and the perspective-taking task are not yet 
engaging in an interaction, they may be cognitively preparing for an interaction. The sheer 
proximity of their partners and the similarity of their tasks, the interactionist might argue, 
creates the sense that they are about to interact with one another, and this leads them to 
become more sensitive to their partner’s perspective and action possibilities. Alternatively, 
these contexts might be said to create the illusion of interaction, where in fact there is none. 
Either way, the objection might go, these effects really only make sense in an interactionist 
framework.  
We think that this objection makes an important point, but also a crucial concession. It 
may well be true that the cognitive processing that takes place in these near-interactive 
contexts have the function of supporting interaction. However, the fact remains that their 
presence was revealed in a non-interactive context, and that interaction is not necessary for 
eliciting them. Rather, the non-interactive task-design was a crucial part of discovering these 
processes. Thus, even if interaction might be a part of the explanation of why these effects 
are present, it was crucial that interaction was not a part of the task that revealed them. 
In sum, it is important to identify the various sub-components of interaction, and not to 
mistake the effects of these sub-components for effects of the interaction itself. In practice, 
this will mean employing experimental paradigms that are explicitly non-interactive.  
3.3. Interaction effects on infant learning 
One line of research that seems to emphasize the importance of interactive methods is the 
literature on ‘natural pedagogy’ (Gergely and Csibra [2005]; Csibra and Gergely [2006], 
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[2009b]). According to this view, when an infant is addressed with certain ostensive signals 
(e.g. eyebrow-raising, eye contact, infant-directed speech), children spontaneously adopt a 
specialized learning stance. This learning stance prepares children to attend to certain kinds 
of information, such as facts about the identity and category-membership (Csibra and 
Gergely [2009a]). The pedagogical stance is also said to facilitate imitative learning.  
The natural pedagogy hypothesis is not an explicitly interactionist proposal. However, it 
does seem to buy into the central methodological prescription of interactionism: there are 
certain forms of cognition that can only be studied in interactive contexts. Experiments in 
this tradition also frequently use observational controls to demonstrate the effects of 
pedagogical learning. For example, Yoon and colleagues found that 9-month olds tended to 
encode information about the location of an object in a non-interactive context, but instead 
encoded information about the object’s identity in an interactive context with pedagogical 
cues (i.e. where an experimenter engaged in infant-directed speech and eye-contact) (Yoon et 
al. [2008]). The authors suggest that this is because interactive, pedagogical contexts prompt 
children to pay special attention to generic information. Likewise, in a study with 14- to 16-
month-olds, Brugger and colleagues found that infants were more likely to imitate novel 
actions more in interactive, pedagogical contexts than in observational contexts (Brugger et al. 
[2007]). Based on these contrastive observational-versus-interactive designs, proponents of 
the natural pedagogy hypothesis argue that pedagogical interactions trigger specialized 
learning mechanisms that are not active in observational contexts. 
The natural pedagogy hypothesis, however, remains controversial if cast as a theory 
specifically about interaction. To see why, note that in Brugger et al. ([2007]) and Yoon et al. 
([2008]), the non-interactive condition was both non-communicative (i.e. the action was 
demonstrated by a solitary person) and observational (i.e. the child was not addressed 
through ostensive cues). Communicative contexts, however, are not necessarily interactive:  
one can observe communication between third parties without actively participating in it. 
Hence, these experiments leave open the possibility that the same learning effects attributed 
to pedagogical interactions might also occur in observational but communicative contexts. 
Once the relevant distinctions are introduced, the importance of interaction in imitative 
learning becomes much less obvious. For instance, (Matheson et al. [2013]) conducted a 
study in which 18-month-olds and 24-month-olds imitated novel actions (e.g. ringing a 
doorbell using one’s forehead) in (a) an interactive condition in which the experimenter 
addressed the infant using typical ostensive cues, (b) an observational and non-
communicative condition in which the infant watched the experimenter perform the novel 
action all by herself, and (c) an observational-communicative condition, in which the infant 
watched the experimenter perform the novel actions while demonstrating them to another 
person. They found that 18-month-olds imitated more in the interactive condition than in 
the observational–non-communicative condition, but not significantly more than in the 
observational–communicative condition. In other words, it was the communicative 
dimension of the interactive condition that seemed to have improved imitation, rather than 
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interaction as such. In 24-month-olds, meanwhile, there were no differences across all three 
conditions.4  
Shimpi and colleagues achieved a similar result while also manipulating the child’s 
familiarity with the imitative model (e.g. whether the model was a family member, a complete 
stranger, or a stranger with whom the child had briefly interacted5 before the task began) 
(Shimpi et al. [2013]). Interestingly, children in the observational-communicative condition 
imitated consistently regardless of whether they were familiar with the model; in contrast, 
children in the interactive condition imitated far less with unfamiliar models than familiar 
models. Thus, while children were quite adept at learning imitate complete strangers in 
observational–communicative contexts, some familiarity with the model was a prerequisite 
for imitative learning in interactive contexts.  
On the one hand, these experiments do suggest that interaction can facilitate imitative 
learning in infants. However, these effects are not particularly pronounced: in Matheson et al. 
(2013) imitative learning in the older children was the same for all three conditions; in 
Shimpi et al. ([2013]) observational learning in communicative contexts was robust; and 
interactive learning was crucially dependent on the familiarity of the actor. The importance 
of interaction in imitative learning thus appears to be overstated. Similar observational-
communicative controls have yet to be carried out for other forms of learning described by 
the natural pedagogy hypothesis (e.g. generic learning), and we cannot say for certain 
whether observational learning will be equally robust in that domain. However, we think 
there is good reason to find out. 
3.4. Conversational alignment 
We’ve noted that there are several social factors that are present in many social interactions, 
that have noticeable effects on social cognition, and that might be mistaken for interaction 
effects, but which are in fact non-interactive. However, an interactionist might object, even if 
these factors are present in non-interactive scenarios, they may still have unique effects in 
the context of a social interaction. Take, for instance, our paradigmatic example of a social 
interaction: conversation. We have pointed out that language use, by itself, is not inherently 
interactive. But, the interactionist might insist, language works much differently when 
studied as monologue than when it is studied as dialogue. 
This is the central point behind the ‘interactive alignment’ research program of Martin 
Pickering and Simon Garrod, which has focused on the nature of speech production and 
comprehension during naturalistic dialogues (Garrod and Pickering [2004], [2009], Pickering 
and Garrod [2004], [2013]). Explicit in this research program is a critique of psycholinguistic 
theories based on the study of comprehension and production of speech in non-interactive 
                                                          
4 Interestingly, emulation was significantly higher in the solitary–non-communicative condition than in the interactive 
condition. (An actor’s action is said to be emulated by an agent, if the actor’s goal is copied by the action. An action is said to be 
imitated, if the agent copies the actor’s exact action sequence.) 
5 Familiarity was established through a 10-minute warm-up period in which the experimenter played a sorting game with the 
child. 
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contexts (i.e. monologue). The most natural and basic form of language use, they claim, is 
dialogue; to develop a full understanding of the mechanisms of language, we need to study it 
in this form.  
Central to Pickering and Garrod’s positive account is the observation that speakers in a 
dialogue will tend to converge upon matching representations at the lexical, semantic, and 
syntactic levels—a phenomenon the authors call ‘conversational alignment’. For instance, 
syntactic alignment refers to the spontaneous tendency of a speaker to use a particular 
syntactic construction when that same construction has just been used by an interlocutor 
(e.g. the cowboy gives the pirate a banana versus the pirate gives the banana to the pirate 
(Pickering and Branigan [1999]; Branigan et al. [2000], [2007])). In dialogue, this alignment of 
representations is said to take place at multiple levels simultaneously, with alignment at one 
level facilitating alignment at other levels through the co-activation of multi-level associative 
networks. As a result of this alignment process, participants in a dialogue achieve a high level 
of communicative fluency. This enables them to rapidly recover meaning from each other’s 
utterances, even when these utterances are otherwise fragmentary, overlapping, and entirely 
ungrammatical. Other researchers have also extended the study of alignment in dialogue 
beyond the coordination of linguistic representations, and found evidence for analogous 
forms of synchronization in eye movements (Dale et al. [2011]) and heart-rate (Fusaroli et al. 
[2016]). 
We agree with the general project of studying dialogue in naturalistic circumstances. 
However, we argue that much of Pickering and Garrod’s own account of the mechanisms 
supporting conversational alignment depends upon evidence from individualistic paradigms. 
Moreover, while there are some differences in the magnitude of the relevant effects when 
these are measured in interactive contexts, these differences are readily explained in terms of 
other non-interactive mechanisms, such as increased attention. Finally, even where we do 
find uniquely interactive alignment effects, individualistic mechanisms still play an important 
role in their explanation. 
For instance, Garrod and Pickering have suggested that alignment between speakers and 
listeners is a product of representational processes that are shared between the 
comprehension and production systems. Thus, when a listener hears an utterance of a 
sentence with a certain syntactic form or lexical item, those representations are primed for 
use in speech production. However, much of the evidence that Pickering and Garrod 
present for this mechanistic hypothesis is derived from non-interactive tasks (i.e. 
‘monologue’). For instance, the ‘structural persistence’ or priming of syntactic forms from 
comprehension to production has been established in numerous individualistic experimental 
paradigms, which Pickering and Garrod cite as evidence (Bock [1986]; Bock et al. [2007]). 
Pickering and Garrod (2013) also suggest that the shared representational processes in 
comprehension and production are the product of forward modelling mechanisms for 
action-planning (Davidson and Wolpert [2004]; Tourville et al. [2008]) that have been 
repurposed for the covert imitation and prediction of observed actions (i.e. mirror neurons 
(Gallese et al. [1996]; Umiltà et al. [2001])). But again, the evidence for such mechanisms is 
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drawn from paradigms that are entirely individualistic (Watkins et al. [2003]; Pulvermüller et 
al. [2006]; Ito et al. [2009]; Möttönen and Watkins [2009]; Adank and Devlin [2010]). Far 
from being irrelevant to our understanding of language, it seems that our understanding of 
interaction effects in language actually depends upon evidence gathered in non-interactive 
paradigms. 
While the mechanisms underlying various alignment phenomena are present in non-
interactive contexts, the case could be made that these mechanisms behave differently in 
social interactions. Branigan and colleagues ([2007]), for example, developed an interactive 
paradigm in which they were able to compare the rates of syntactic priming in participants in 
a conversational interaction with those in individuals who were merely side-participants. 
While they found syntactic priming effects in both groups, these effects were significantly 
stronger when a speaker had just been addressed than when he or she was merely listening 
to other individuals speak; but, as Branigan and colleagues themselves note, this effect is 
likely due to the fact that current addressee’s were attending to the speaker more carefully 
than side-participants. Increased attention, of course, is not a uniquely interactive 
phenomenon. This suggests that while alignment does increase in the context of 
conversational interactions, alignment is nevertheless explained by a host of mechanisms 
that do not operate only in interactive contexts. 
There are some aspects of conversational alignment that are, in fact, uniquely interactive. 
For instance, Garrod and Pickering ([2009]) describe how participants in a dialogue also 
coordinate upon the timing of their utterances, which tends to yield fairly precise patterns of 
turn-taking (Ten Bosch et al. [2004]; Levinson [2016]). This phenomenon truly has no non-
interactive equivalent, since turn-taking is by definition impossible in a monologue. We 
happily concede that this might be a case where an interactive context is necessary to truly 
grasp the nature of the phenomenon. However, Garrod and Pickering’s explanation for our 
capacity for precise turn-taking in conversation invokes precisely the same covert imitation 
and priming mechanisms that explain other aspects of alignment. Thus, even if our 
knowledge of this phenomenon depends upon interactive experimental designs, we owe our 
understanding of it to individualistic research. 
Thus, while dialogue is often cited as a paradigm case of an irreducibly interactive 
process, we would argue that conversational alignment arises from mechanisms that are not 
inherently interactive. In some cases, we do see these mechanisms operating differently in 
the context of interaction. In the case of turn-taking, we seem to have an instance of a 
genuine interaction effect. But other properties of dialogue, such as syntactic alignment, are 
also present in monologue; indeed, our very understanding of this aspect of dialogue is due 
to its study in non-interactive contexts.  
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4. How Much Does ‘Real’ Interaction Matter? 
It is sometimes suggested that interaction dynamics cannot be explained if we only look at 
the sum of the interactors’ individual contributions to the encounter.6 We don’t wish to take 
a final stand on these issues in this paper. In this section, we’d simply like to point out that 
most of the interactionists’ own experiments seem to tacitly presuppose an individualist 
framework.  
In a series of experiments, Schilbach and colleagues have investigated interaction-specific 
neural activation patterns of action-control (Schilbach et al. [2011]), joint attention (Schilbach 
et al. [2010a]), and mutual gaze (Schilbach et al. [2006a]). In most of these experiments a 
subject is placed in an fMRI scanner engaging in some kind of interaction with a virtual 
character. Roughly, these experiments indicate that cues associated with interaction such as 
self-directed gaze are associated with differential neural activation in the medial prefrontal 
cortex, which is a region thought to be crucially implicated in social cognition (Van 
Overwalle [2009]). For instance, Schilbach finds differentially increased neural activation in 
the medial prefrontal cortex for (a.) direct (vs. other-directed) gaze (Schilbach et al. [2006b]), 
and for following (vs. leading) someone’s gaze (Schilbach et al. [2010b]). To account for the 
interactive element, all participants are made to believe that the virtual character is controlled 
by a real person with whom the interaction will subsequently take place. This belief, 
however, was false: the virtual character was entirely preprogrammed to establish conditions 
of a controlled experiment. As a result, participants are not actually interacting. In terms of 
experimental design, this is fine; but what these experiments tacitly presuppose is that a 
subject’s individual representation of a situation as interactive is sufficient to gain crucial 
insights in the cognitive significance of interaction.  
One notable exception departing from the virtual-character paradigm is a study 
conducted by Cavallo and colleagues ([2015]). In this study, subjects established eye contact 
with a collaborator who was situated behind the fMRI scanner. The collaborator was visible 
to the participant via a mirror placed inside the scanner. In the experiment, either both 
subjects looked at each other (i.e. mutual gaze) or one of them looked away (i.e. averted 
gaze). In the control conditions participants either looked at their own eyes in a mirror 
reflection, or they looked at an image of the collaborator. Cavallo and colleagues found that 
mutual gaze differentially activates the anterior portions of the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC).  
As indicated above, Schilbach and colleagues found similar patterns of activation, even 
though they relied upon paradigms that used virtual characters (Schilbach et al. [2006b], 
[2010b]). Comparing these experiments, it seems that real interaction does not seem to have 
made a crucial difference to activation in the mPFC, which was the main finding in the 
                                                          
6 For instance, De Jaegher et al. argue that ‘interactive processes [...] complement and even replace individual mechanisms’ (De 
Jaegher et al. [2010], p. 441). At the heart of this proposal is the idea that partitioning social cognitive processes into the 
cognitive mechanisms implemented by individual brains is unwarranted.  Rather, it is the interaction between brains that should 
be considered explanatorily basic.  
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mutual gaze condition. Furthermore, Cavallo and colleagues found that neural activation was 
independent of whether subjects actually established eye contact or whether subjects merely 
knew that the collaborator was looking at them. Hence, it was the ‘mere belief of being seen’ 
(Cavallo et al. [2015], p. 67) which accounted for the distinct pattern of neural activation; 
actual interaction seemed irrelevant. Importantly, while experiments by Schilbach et al. 
support the idea that even simulated interaction leads to activation in the mPFC, the study 
by Cavallo et al. provides direct comparative evidence for the claim that real interaction is not 
crucial for the relevant neural activation patterns to occur. Lastly, while Schilbach also 
reports increased activity in the amygdala, Cavallo finds no such activity.7 And even if 
differential activation in the amygdala were to indicate a difference between virtual and real 
interactions, the absence of such activity in a real interactive conditions is rather bad news 
for the interactionists, who have pointed out that emotional engagement is a crucial 
cognitive element in social interactions (Reddy [2008]; Schilbach et al. [2013]). 
Together these observations suggest that, at least in gaze paradigms, it is more significant 
whether a subject believes that she engaged in an interaction; and not so much whether she 
is actually engaged in an interaction.  
5. Conclusion 
Our aim in this paper has been to draw attention to the various conceptual and 
methodological confusions that arise when we over-emphasize the notion of interaction in 
social cognition research. First, we argued that De Jaegher and colleagues’ prominent 
definition of interaction diverged significantly from the intuitive consensus, and also seems 
to equivocate on the notion of autonomy. Second, we illustrated how interactive paradigms 
potentially confound genuine interaction effects with the effects of factors that merely co-
occur with interaction. Finally, we showed that genuine interactions are not needed to study 
the effects of interaction on cognition: the mere representation of interactivity will often do 
just as well. Genuine interactivity, although often the distal cause of such representations, do 
not play a special role in explaining these effects.  
However, our goal in this paper is not completely negative, and we are not wholly 
opposed to interactive experimental designs; rather, we advocate for a complementary, 
multi-method approach that includes both interactive and non-interactive methods. 
However, when interactive designs are used, we advise that researchers remain cautious in 
their interpretations, and that they implement appropriate controls before attributing the 
effects they discover to interaction as such. We hope that by drawing attention to the various 
confounds and confusions that arise in interactive experimental designs, we have clarified 
the significance of interaction in social cognition research. With this added clarity, we hope, 
researchers will now be better positioned to pursue the goal of making experimental 
                                                          
7 Notably, involvement of the amygdala has been inconsistent throughout an array of studies investigating mutual gaze. For 
instance, while a number of authors (Kawashima et al. [1999]; Wicker et al. [2003]; Sato et al. [2004]; Schilbach et al. [2006a]) 
have found activation in the amygdala during mutual gaze, several others have not (Calder et al. [2002]; Pageler et al. [2003]).  
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paradigms in social cognition research more ecologically valid. With this end in mind, we 
have three general suggestions for future research: 
1. Interaction is complicated, but defining it doesn’t have to be: 
While the philosophical debate surrounding the ontology of social interaction is still 
ongoing, this debate need not impinge upon practical applications of the concept of 
interaction in research contexts. The notion of autonomy, in particular, serves 
merely to obscure, rather than to clarify, the meaning of ‘social interaction’. In lieu 
of the one provided by De Jaegher and colleagues, we have offered our own 
definition that captures the intuitive notion of social interaction with minimal 
conceptual baggage. 
2. Interaction effects versus social effects on social cognition: 
Ordinary social interactions are complex events, which tend to involve a cluster of 
social elements that are not themselves interactive. This makes it difficult to study 
the effects of interaction as such, because we must distinguish the effects of 
interaction from concomitant social factors. Researchers interested in improving 
upon the ecological validity of social cognition paradigms must recognize these 
factors could potentially dissociate from interaction, and ought to be investigated in 
their own right. 
3. Real versus represented interaction: 
Many of the purported effects of interaction on social cognition can also be found 
in pseudo-interactive paradigms. This shows that paradigms manipulating beliefs 
about interaction can be just as informative as the paradigms that involve genuine 
interaction. Once this individualist insight into the ‘interactionist turn’ is taken on 
board, it opens up practical possibilities for social cognition research by making the 
problem of social interaction more empirically tractable. 
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